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Abstract 
The paper explores possible frontiers of historical-institutionalist analysis. It argues 
three points: that progress will require a return from a static to a dynamic perspective 
in which change is no longer a special case but a universal condition of any social order; 
that theory must not a priori rule out the possibility that institutional change may be 
more than just random fluctuation, and that it could instead be part of a transition 
from one state of development to another; and that capturing the dynamic nature of 
social institutions – and of social order in general – will require an analytical framework 
that is adapted to the historical specificities of concrete social formations. Central con-
cepts around which future work in institutionalist political economy may be organized 
are suggested to be history, development, evolution, and capitalist development. The 
general idea is that social science stands to benefit, not from ever-advancing abstrac-
tion and generalization, but on the contrary from fitting its theoretical template to the 
historical specificity of the society it is dealing with.
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz untersucht mögliche Entwicklungslinien historisch-institutionalistischer 
Forschung in der politischen Ökonomie. Drei Thesen werden vorgestellt: (1) Theore-
tischer Fortschritt erfordert eine Rückkehr von statischen zu dynamisch-historischen 
Analysen; (2) Theorien dürfen nicht von vornherein die Möglichkeit ausschließen, dass 
institutioneller Wandel mehr ist als eine Folge zufälliger Fluktuationen in einem kons-
tanten Merkmalsraum und dass es sich stattdessen um einen Übergang von einem Ent-
wicklungsstadium zum anderen handeln könnte; (3) eine Rückbesinnung auf den dy-
namischen Charakter sozialer Institutionen, und sozialer Ordnung allgemein, erfordert 
einen Ansatz, der den historischen Besonderheiten konkreter Gesellschaftsformationen 
Rechnung trägt. Als zentrale Begriffe künftiger institutionalistischer Forschung in der 
politischen Ökonomie werden Geschichte, Entwicklung, Evolution und kapitalistische 
Entwicklung behandelt. Fortschritte in den Sozialwissenschaften werden nicht durch 
immer weiter vorangetriebene Abstraktion und Verallgemeinerung erreicht, sondern 
im Gegenteil durch die Spezifizierung ihrer theoretischen Begriffe nach Maßgabe der 
historischen Besonderheiten der jeweils untersuchten Gesellschaft.
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Political economy, in the widest sense, is the science of the laws governing the production and 
exchange of the material means of subsistence in human society … The conditions under which 
men produce and exchange vary from country to country, and within each country again from 
generation to generation. Political economy, therefore, cannot be the same for all countries and 
for all historical epochs. (Engels 1947 [1878], Part II, Ch. 1)
Classical social science explored how the modern way of life grew out of the past, and 
what this might imply for the future. Both early sociology and early economics studied 
in one the functioning and the transformation of the emerging political-economic in-
stitutions of capitalist society. In the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Weber – even in 
Adam Smith, and certainly in Schumpeter – static and dynamic analyses were insepa-
rable: The way modern institutions worked was explained in terms of their location in a 
historical process, while the way that process would continue was assumed to be driven 
by institutions’ present functions and dysfunctions.
The modern social sciences, in comparison, tend to be satisfied with a more static per-
spective. Empirical observations are organized into abstract concepts and property spaces 
that supposedly apply to all human societies at all times, without allowing for differences 
by historical or geographic location.1 Clearly, the search for historically universal and 
invariant laws reflects the model of the physical sciences, which are mostly comfortable 
assuming that they are dealing with an invariant, ahistorical nature. Another reason may 
be identification with that powerful disciplinary aggressor, modern economics – which, 
in mimicking eighteenth-century mechanics,2 has long ceased to add indices of time and 
place to the supposedly universal principles it claims to discover.
A static approach also prevails in the comparative study of institutions, and sometimes 
even among those who consider themselves contributors to what is called “historical 
institutionalism.” This is not difficult to understand. Comparative institutionalism as a 
theoretical concern in politics and political economy emerged out of a critical response 
to two dominant streams of social science in the 1960s: pluralist industrialism and or-
thodox Marxism (on the following see Streeck 2006). Both advertised themselves as the-
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at a workshop of the Working Group on Institu-
tional Change, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, June 22, 2009. I am grateful 
to the participants for constructive comments and criticism, in particular to Renate Mayntz who 
served as discussant.
1 I define a property space as a finite universe of properties, or dimensions of measurement, con-
ceived as variables with a range of possible values. It is populated by units, or cases, which are 
discrete combinations of variable or constant properties. Units and their properties are related 
to other units and properties in unknown but in principle knowable ways, with a change in 
the value of an “independent” property “causing” proportionate change in a “dependent” one. 
Theory is to make sense of measurements taken in empirical research of the variable properties 
of units, by establishing the general principles that govern how properties are related to each 
other. Theory is general to the extent that it succeeds in subsuming observed units and measure-
ments under a set of universally applicable categories, properties and relations.
2 Adam Smith’s favorite discipline as a university teacher was – Newtonian – astronomy.
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ories of political-economic change, and each offered its own grand historical narrative. 
Pluralist industrialism (Kerr et al. 1960) – or more generally, modernization theory – 
told of impending worldwide convergence somewhere between the political-economic 
models of the U.S. and the then-U.S.S.R., implying an end to ideological politics as one 
knew it at the time, and its replacement with rational technocratic administration of the 
constraints and opportunities of industrial modernity. Orthodox Marxism, by contrast, 
predicted a gradual but irreversible decline of capitalism as a result of its own success, 
with an ever-growing organic composition of capital as the ultimate destiny and fate of 
the capitalist accumulation regime. Comparative politics and institutionalist political 
economy were rightly skeptical of both. Arguing against pluralist industrialism, they 
insisted on the continuing significance of politics as a collective agency and as a source 
of diversity in social organization. And in contrast to orthodox Marxism, they empha-
sized the capacity of the social institutions into which modern capitalism is organized 
– including the state – to modify and even suspend the alleged “laws of motion” of the 
capitalist accumulation regime. 
In the process, however, comparative institutional analysis lost sight of the two main 
subjects of social science since its rise in the nineteenth century: the historical dynam-
ics of the social world and the evolution of capitalism. In a healthy reaction against 
the implied teleological determinism of the leading macro-sociological paradigms of 
the 1950s and 1960s, what had begun as an investigation of the underlying social and 
economic forces driving the development of modern society turned into a comparative 
statics of individual socioeconomic institutions – mostly but not systematically located 
in contemporary capitalism. More often than not, comparative institutionalism turned 
into pseudo-universalistic “variable sociology”: If you have centralized collective bar-
gaining and an independent central bank, you can expect an inflation rate lower or 
higher than that of countries whose institutional ameublement is different. The fact that 
most of the cases under examination were confined to a very small universe in time and 
space – that most societies never had a central bank – did not seem to matter. “Histori-
cal” institutionalism meritoriously added policy legacies and institutional pasts to the 
set of variables that were routinely considered when trying to account for the structures 
and outcomes of political-economic institutions. Typically, however, it was not history 
that was brought into play but – as in the study of “path dependency” – the costs of 
change as compared to its expected returns (Arthur 1994; Pierson 2004). 
The present paper is an attempt to outline what I believe will – or in any case should – be 
the future frontiers of institutionalist analysis in political economy. In particular, I will 
make three points. First, I will argue that progress in comparative institutional analysis 
will require a return from a static to a dynamic perspective. Developing such a perspec-
tive will be possible, I believe, if we use current work on institutional change as a start-
ing point, drawing on its core concepts for an approach in which change is no longer 
a special case but a universal condition of any social order. In effect, this will eradicate 
the distinction between institutional statics and institutional dynamics, conceived of as 
different states of the world requiring different conceptual frameworks.
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Second, and related to this, I will discuss how individual institutions and their compara-
tive analysis might be placed in a broader systemic context by locating them in a struc-
tured historical process. The question that will need to be addressed here is whether 
our theories and methods have the capacity to detect regularities in the continuous 
transformation of social institutions, or whether our justified suspicion of teleological 
accounts of history as unidirectional “development,” with the various implications that 
have been attached to them in the past, requires us to overlook the forest, if there be 
one, and recognize only single trees. Is institutional change just random fluctuation, or 
can it be a transition from one state of development to another? In this context, I will 
revisit the old issue of historical direction and “progress” that dominated nineteenth-
century social science and continued to be present until the 1960s, when it was finally 
abandoned as intractable or politically incorrect or both.3 The theoretical problem be-
hind this is, of course, that of the apparently perennial tension between historical and 
systematic explanations in the social sciences, or between agency and contingency on 
the one hand and possible “laws” of historical change on the other. The difficulties that 
we encounter here are so enormous that even Max Weber shied away from them – with 
the result that much of modern social science feels excused if it prefers to ignore them.
Third and finally, I will suggest that capturing the inevitably dynamic nature of social 
institutions – and of social order in general – will make it necessary to move beyond the 
universal and timeless concepts that much of social science still believes are required 
for scientific respectability, to an analytical framework that is adapted to the histori-
cal specificities of concrete social formations.4 In the case of the political economy of 
contemporary societies, the social formation in question is modern capitalism, just as 
it was in the nineteenth century when social science originated. In the same way that 
economic action is always “embedded” in a society, I argue that institutional analysis 
of the contemporary political economy, comparative or not, should be situated within 
the context of a substantive theory of capitalism,5 to be informed and enriched by it as 
well as contributing to its improvement. The general idea is that social science, perhaps 
unlike some of the natural sciences, benefits not from ever-advancing abstraction and 
generalization, but on the contrary, from fitting its theoretical template to the historical 
specificity of whatever society it is dealing with.
3 One could also suspect that as the Marxist vision of historical development finally fell into dis-
repute, the American alternative seemed so unpalatable by the end of the 1960s that historical 
philosophy in general was avoided. 
4 In other words, as will become more apparent below, I think that the quote from Friedrich En-
gels that introduces this paper is still of the highest methodological significance.
5 For an extended argument to this effect, see Streeck (2009), in particular Chapter 17.
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1 Institutional dynamics
To clarify what I mean by a dynamic perspective on institutions, I will begin – for reasons 
that will become apparent shortly – with the frequently made distinction, often just im-
plicit, between marginal and “real” institutional change. This distinction is of no small 
importance. Theoretical as well as political debates often become mired in the question 
of whether an observed or imagined change in the properties of a given institutional ar-
rangement will cause it to be replaced by something new or, on the contrary, stabilize it: 
whether, in other words, the change is revolutionary or reformative in nature. To many, 
the only way to settle such disputes appears to be by definitional fiat, treating it as a mat-
ter of convention whether or not a given characteristic is central or peripheral to a spe-
cific institution or social order. For example, one of the main themes in Tocqueville’s late 
masterpiece on the ancien régime (Tocqueville 1983 [1856]) is whether it was the mon-
archy or administrative centralization that was the defining element of the institutional 
structure of pre-revolutionary France. Suggesting that it was the latter, Tocqueville con-
cluded that in spite of all the bloodshed and the grandiose rhetoric, the rupture caused 
by the Revolution was far less significant than his contemporaries believed.
However, treating the continuity or discontinuity of a social order as a matter of defini-
tion is not always satisfactory, if only because definitions are ultimately arbitrary and 
everyone can feel free to stick to his own. The result tends to be fruitless debates of the 
sort of whether a glass is half full or half empty, with the answer depending on one’s 
point of view or the mood of the day. Steven Krasner’s seminal article on sovereignty 
and the modern state system (1988), which marked a major step in the revival of the 
institutionalist tradition, points to a possible answer by suggesting that social systems 
normally exist in a state of equilibrium, with change occurring only occasionally, most-
ly as a result of exogenous shocks. “Real” change may then be recognized by the fact 
that it is rare and catastrophic, like defeat in war and subsequent conquest; whereas 
what others might consider incremental or gradual change serves in fact to defend and 
restore an existing order against environmental disturbances that are not strong enough 
to cause the system to break down. The upshot is that social institutions change by 
moving through a discontinuous sequence of “long periods of either relative stasis or 
path-dependent change” (Krasner 1988: 74), “punctuated” by brief moments of rapid 
re-organization for a new phase of protracted stability.6 
6 The concept of “punctuated equilibrium,” which Krasner uses to capture what he regards as the 
dynamics of institutional change, is taken from an important dissident stream in evolutionary 
biology (Eldredge 1985; Eldredge/Gould 1972; Gould/Eldredge 1977). Krasner’s article still rep-
resents one of the most convincing proposals as to how to make Darwinian evolutionary theory 
fruitful for the social sciences. In evolutionary biology, the notion of punctuated equilibrium 
is intended to account for the fact that the strict continuity, or gradualism, in the development 
of the life forms that the logic of Darwin’s theory required is not borne out by the fossil record 
(e.g., the mystery of the “Cambrian explosion”). Darwin insisted – and had to insist – that this 
could only have been because the fossil record is incomplete, for sound reasons of geology and 
natural history. By contrast, opponents of “Darwinian fundamentalism” (Gould 1997) suggest 
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Krasner’s model identifies “real,” i.e. transformative change, with rapid, discontinuous, 
non-fluid change in response to an exogenous shock. In this way he makes it empirically 
distinguishable from trivial, superficial, marginal, or restorative change, which may be 
recognized as such by the fact that it is gradual. The problem with this approach is that 
it runs counter to the observation that not only abrupt but also gradual change may 
have profound enough consequences to justify considering an institution or a social 
system to be fundamentally transformed by it. In historical institutionalism, the notion 
of gradual transformative change was first advanced in the work of Kathleen Thelen 
(1999, 2002). With the concepts of “conversion” and “layering,” Thelen offered two styl-
ized, ideal-typical accounts of change processes, drawn from observation rather than 
from theory, which have in common that they take place slowly and incrementally and 
do not depend on exogenous shocks to get started. Thelen’s re-conceptualization of in-
stitutional change opened up a perspective for institutional analysis on a type of change 
that is both continuous and fundamental, allowing for a much more dynamic concept of 
institutions than is possible in the “long stability-short rupture” model of punctuated 
equilibrium. It is important to note that conversion and layering were not meant to be 
an exhaustive typology. In joint work, we (Streeck/Thelen 2005) later added three more 
processes of gradual-cum-transformative institutional change: “drift,” “displacement,” 
and “exhaustion,” while leaving open the possibility that others may yet be found and 
stylized in comparable ways.
Rather than discussing the five types of incremental transformative change in detail, I 
will limit myself to noting that in all of them, the mechanism that makes for continuous 
revision of social institutions is their enactment. Institutions are norms that regulate 
social behavior; they are realized and reproduced in practice through human agents 
applying them to their specific situations. Such enactment, as we have pointed out 
(Streeck/Thelen 2005), cannot be and never is mechanistic. The reason for this is that 
the conditions under which social rules are supposed to apply are inevitably unique and 
vary in time, due to the fact that the world is more complex than the principles we have 
devised to make it predictable. This forces actors to apply rules creatively, in the process 
developing them further by modifying them. Moreover, social actors are far from being 
norm-following machines; in fact, they command a defining capacity to reinterpret or 
evade rules that are supposed to apply to them. Both creative modification and cunning 
circumvention are a permanent source of disturbance – and, from the perspective of the 
institution – of random variation from below, with the result that the reproduction of 
social institutions through their enactment is always and inevitably imperfect. Time is 
crucial in this since in all five mechanisms of gradual transformation through imperfect 
reproduction, change accumulates only slowly, as a by-product of actors following rules 
in their own ways, because they must or because they want to. 
that the fossil record may be less incomplete than Darwin thought and that there may have been 
long periods of relative stasis in natural history, interrupted by short moments of widespread 
and accelerated evolutionary change. The implication would be that evolution advances not 
continuously, but in fits and spurts.
10 MPIfG Discussion Paper 09 / 8
Obviously, the Thelen and Streeck ideal types fall far short of settling the issue of how 
to distinguish real from trivial institutional change; but then, they may render the dis-
tinction meaningless. While they establish that gradual change may have transformative 
effects, nowhere do they imply that all gradual change is of this kind. Nor do they rule 
out the possibility that social systems may sometimes break down under the impact of 
exogenous shocks, causing the kind of rapid shift toward a radically new structure that 
is captured, albeit unjustifiably privileged, by Krasner’s punctuated-equilibrium model 
of institutional change. In fact, as I have shown empirically (Streeck 2009), gradual 
change may accumulate over time until a tipping point is reached where an institution 
suddenly breaks down. In Marxist-Hegelian language, this is when “quantity” turns into 
“quality,” which is one of the defining characteristics of what used to be called “dia-
lectical” change.7 In evolutionary biology, this type of change appears as a version of 
the punctuated-equilibrium model, where rapid change is caused by a slowly increas-
ing discrepancy between a changing environment and an ecological system’s adaptive 
capacity, or by a slow accumulation of internal tensions that finally cause a system to 
break down (Eldredge 1985).8
Further below I will argue that the question of whether an observed change amounts to 
fundamental systemic change cannot be decided in the abstract, but only in the context 
of a substantive theory of the historical social order in which it takes place. Here I sim-
ply note that in hindsight, the most important contribution of the Thelen and Streeck 
models may be that they systematically introduce time into institutional analysis. To the 
extent that institutionalist punctuated-equilibrium models sharply distinguish between 
rapid real change and “relative stasis or path-dependent change” (Krasner 1988: 74), 
time is, just as in neoclassical economics, essentially irrelevant. How long the periods of 
stability between the critical moments of punctuation last depends exclusively on con-
tingent events that have nothing to do with how long they have already lasted, and the 
moments during which a system is reorganized are conceived as so infinitesimally short 
that they can ideally be considered as taking no time at all. In the Thelen and Streeck 
models, by contrast, institutions are, in principle, always in transition, with periods of 
stasis, if they occur at all, being so exceptional and short as to be negligible for theoreti-
cal purposes. In fact, conversion and layering (and later drift, displacement and exhaus-
tion) are defined as processes for which time is of the essence: They take place in time, and 
their effects accumulate with time. Time matters for them, but it matters all the time and 
not just once in a while, since institutional change is basically conceived as an unending 
process of learning about the inevitably imperfect enactment of social rules in interac-
tion with a complex and unpredictable environment.
7 The notion of dialectical change may be seen as reconciling Krasner’s punctuated-equilibrium 
model of change with the newer idea of gradual transformative change, with the latter slowly 
accumulating until a tipping point is reached.
8 I owe this insight to Renate Mayntz. 
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Introducing time into institutional analysis – analyzing institutions in time – implies, 
among other things, that an important property of an institution may be its age. The 
longer an institution has been around, the more likely it is, everything else being equal, 
to have changed through layering or conversion, drift or displacement – certainly 
through exhaustion, and very likely through other, similar mechanisms. From here, it 
is not a long way to the notion that social institutions may be affected not just by the 
chronological time that has passed since their inception, but also by their location in his-
torical time – i.e., in a more or less orderly succession of historically unique, contingent 
conditions and events. Taking this only a small step further and stretching the point 
somewhat, it appears that time passed may itself and as such be something like a driver 
and even a cause of institutional change. In fact, I suggest that it is precisely a conceptual 
framework like this, one in which time figures as a privileged explanans,9 that distin-
guishes a dynamic from a static perspective on the social world in general and on insti-
tutional change in particular – a perspective that is complex enough to accommodate 
any combination of gradual and disruptive change as well as to distinguish between 
trivial and nontrivial change on substantive rather than formal grounds.
Moving from a static approach to institutional theory to a dynamic one has deep on-
tological implications, which I can only touch upon here. The main point is that struc-
tures, or systems, must be re-conceptualized as processes, and as irreversible ones if 
only because by occupying the time they take, they consume it once and for all, making 
it impossible for alternative processes to realize themselves in the same time-space.10,11 
How demanding it is to include time in an analytical framework, for the social world 
9 Or in which what the applicable explanatory principles are depends on how much time has 
passed since the beginning of time, or the inception of the system. I understand that this is 
now common wisdom in cosmological physics.
10 For an example see Streeck (2009), Chapter 8. Irreversibility is the essence of historicity. What 
it means is illustrated by colloquial observations such as that you can turn eggs into scrambled 
eggs but not vice versa, or that you cannot put toothpaste back into the tube once it is out. A 
more respectable example is the second law of thermodynamics, or the law of increasing entro-
py, according to which differences in temperature, density and pressure in a closed system tend 
to even out over time, gradually and inevitably replacing order with disorder unless the process 
is halted from outside the system. The second law of thermodynamics is central to the work of 
the young Max Planck. Like the cosmological theory of an expanding universe, it may serve to 
show that biology is not the only natural science with an historical concept of the world. For 
an interesting attempt to apply the notion of entropy to the organization of societies – where 
entropic tendencies are strongly present but can be pushed back by collective mobilization – see 
Etzioni (1968).
11 Irreversibility does not, of course, mean that, for example, a transition from a military dicta-
torship to a democracy cannot in a colloquial sense be reversed, with the military returning to 
power. However, for the time in which democracy prevailed, nothing else can ex post be inserted 
in the historical stream of events. What has historically happened cannot be undone – which 
also means that there can never be an exact return to a past condition, as the memory of what 
happened in between will always be present. A military dictatorship that has returned after hav-
ing overthrown a democracy is not the same as a military dictatorship following, say, a foreign 
occupation. 
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just as for any other, is illustrated (or so it may seem) by the difference between the 
three-dimensional Newtonian and the n-dimensional relativistic concept of space. The 
former is essentially time-invariant, regardless of all the motion going on inside it; the 
latter not only changes with time but is also, as the unfortunately unintelligible Ein-
steinian metaphor has it, “bent” into it. Of course, the ultimate witness for a dynamic, 
processual perspective on the world is the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus of 
Ephesus (540–475 BC), who unfortunately was not dubbed “the Obscure” already by 
his contemporaries for nothing. Even Plato, in the Kratylos dialogue, had to guess what 
Heraclitus had really meant to say:
Heraclitus, I believe, says that all things go and nothing stays, and comparing existents to the 
flow of a river, he says you could not step twice into the same river.12
Institutional analysis in Heraclitian fashion would assume that, as time passes, the social 
world continuously changes, not just ephemerally but fundamentally: constantly de-
veloping new properties and functioning according to ever-changing principles.13 The 
idea that one cannot step in the same river twice would have to be translated to mean 
that the historical process alters not just the properties but the property space of institu-
tions and social orders, by turning variables into constants and constants into variables, 
redefining variable ranges, resetting parameters, introducing new kinds of units, and 
undoing or reversing causal links between properties as well as creating new ones. What 
happens changes the rules that govern what happens next, confronting actors at any 
given time with a world that is in part unexplored and will have changed further by 
the time it could, perhaps, be understood. Although this not only sounds metaphysical 
but in fact is, examples abound in the real world of politics and economics of events 
12 The shortest aphoristic formulation of Heraclitus’ “flow theory” consists of only two words: 
πάντα ρεί, everything flows. It comes not from Heraclitus himself, but was attributed to him only 
a few hundred years later. Interestingly, Heraclitus was also one of the first dialectical theorists. 
Fragment DK B10 posits: “Connections: things whole and not whole, what is drawn together 
and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. The one is made up of all things, 
and all things issue from the one.” Goethe wrote two poems about Heraclitus, appropriately 
titled Dauer im Wechsel (Continuity in Change) and Eins und Alles (One and All). As always, he 
captures the core of the matter, and as always in irresistibly beautiful language. The second of 
the two poems brings together the two central Heraclitian themes, change and contradiction: 
“Es soll sich regen, schaffend handeln, / Erst sich gestalten, dann verwandeln; / Nur scheinbar stehts 
Momente still. / Das Ewge regt sich fort in allen: / Denn alles muß in Nichts zerfallen, / Wenn es im 
Sein beharren will.”
13 As we will see, the fundamental question for any theory of social development is how these prin-
ciples differ and whether they, in any meaningful sense, evolve over time. Originally modern 
social science was, of course, closely associated with the idea that as societies “progress,” their 
development gradually ceases to be governed by natural laws and is increasingly controlled by 
laws made by people themselves. Humans have always made their own history, Marx wrote, but 
without knowing what they were doing; so history asserted itself behind their backs, governing 
their fate like an alien force. With the arrival of science, however, they can understand the forces 
that control them, and if they understand them, they can replace them with their collective 
will. Up to a short time ago, this figure of thought was the implicit premise of all social science, 
Marxist or not. For an arbitrary selection see Kerr (1960) and Etzioni (1968).
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and developments that have irreversibly rewritten the rules of cause and effect and re-
defined in an unforeseen way the realm of what is and is not possible: the combined 
liberalization and globalization of capitalism in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century; the privatization of council housing by the Thatcher government, which pro-
foundly changed British electoral politics in favor of parties with a conservative pro-
gram; the introduction of social security in the United States, which created an active 
clientele strong enough to make social security politically sacrosanct (Campbell 2003); 
the self-destruction of Keynesian reflationary demand management as firms came ra-
tionally to expect ever-lower interest rates and ever-stronger fiscal stimulus; the slowly 
accumulating effects of solidaristic wage policies, increasing the pressure on firms to 
break away from multi-employer bargaining (Streeck 2009: Ch. 2, passim); the gradual 
accumulation of public debt, reaching a point where the settlement of distributional 
conflicts by public dispensation of future resources becomes self-limiting or impossible; 
etc. (Streeck 2009: Ch. 5).
Returning to my starting point, if the social world and its institutional order are, and 
ought to be, conceived of as inherently dynamic, it no longer makes much sense to dis-
tinguish between trivial and transformative institutional change. Instead, the question 
becomes whether our models of that world and the heuristics we apply in exploring 
it are capable of doing justice to its dynamic, historical-relativist nature, or whether 
they abstract from it for the sake of simplicity and convenience and organize it into a 
property space that is static or Newtonian.14 This question also applies to the study of 
institutional change, which we can imagine to be taking place within either a static or a 
historically dynamic set of parameters. Indeed, just as Newtonian mechanics can, even 
after the relativist revolution, still be usefully applied for limited purposes, a treatment 
of institutional change as fluctuation in a constant world – as static change, as it were – 
may often be sufficient, provided we restrict our theoretical ambitions. We should be 
aware, however, that findings generated in this way hold true only as long as one can 
afford to neglect their dynamic-historical context.
14 For a similar argument see Arthur (1994: 11f., 27f.).
Table 1 Two kinds of change
 Static change Dynamic change
Property space Constant  Historical
 Universal Periodic
Direction Reversible  Irreversible
 Fluctuating Sequential
Source Exogenous-contingent Endogenous-dialectical
  Exogenous-contingent 
Mode Punctuated equilibrium Incremental
  Crossing of thresholds
Mechanism Short sharp shocks Imperfect reproduction 
  Time & age: Layering, 
  conversion, drift, exhaustion etc.
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Summing up so far, static and dynamic concepts of institutional change may be com-
pared as follows (Table 1). A static approach assumes that the “laws governing the pro-
duction and exchange of the material means of subsistence in human society” (Engels 
1947 [1878]) apply at all times and everywhere. A dynamic approach, by contrast, recog-
nizes time – and historical time in particular – as a force that is continuously reshaping 
institutions and the properties that define them. Where the institutional property space 
and the causal relationships existing within it are conceived as constant and universal, 
individual institutions may change under the impact of changes in antecedent condi-
tions, but there is nothing to prevent such conditions from returning to their former 
state and thereby reversing the change they have caused. Static change, in other words, 
knows no direction and is in principle always reversible. This is different from dynamic, 
historical change, whose location in an irreversible sequence is a defining characteristic. 
Furthermore, in a static perspective on change, institutions and social orders are as such 
considered stable, and change occurs only if: it is forced on them from the outside; the 
source of change is exogenous and its nature is contingent; the mode is that of Krasner’s 
punctuated equilibrium; and the mechanism is unpredictable shocks strong enough to 
require structural adjustment. Dynamic change, by comparison, is fundamentally en-
dogenous, as social orders are assumed to change on their own and from within under 
the impact of time: for example, as inherent contradictions mature. Like time, change 
proceeds incrementally, although there may be occasional fits and spurts where critical 
thresholds are crossed; and the central mechanism of institutional change, as pointed 
out, is the imperfect reproduction of institutions in the process of their enactment in 
time. Further down, I will return to some of the se themes.
2 Institutional development
I have argued that a conception of institutional change as static – reversible, fluctuating 
and contingent – cannot do justice to the historical nature of social structures, that is to 
the fact that they are, at a minimum, located in an irreversible sequence of events and 
affected by the passage of time. But how can we conceptualize the historically dynamic 
character of social arrangements? What pattern, if any, is governing the continuous 
transformation of the properties of social arrangements? Does the historical process 
within which institutional change must be assumed to be taking place have a direction? 
The concept that inevitably comes to mind here is that of “development” – a core con-
cept, of course, of nineteenth- and twentieth-century social theory precisely because 
of its close association with the philosophy of history and the notion of progress. As 
previously noted, today’s social science mostly prefers to be agnostic in this respect, and 
has instead taken refuge in an ahistorical, Newtonian image of its object world. If that 
image, however, is found to miss essential aspects of the world, as I argue in the case 
of institutional change, it is impossible to avoid reopening the issue of whether and in 
what ways historical change may be governed by an underlying logic that in one way 
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or another might be characterized as development. This is particularly true if we fol-
low Engels’ advice and specify the conceptual framework of historical-institutionalist 
analysis to fit the historical social formation of capitalism – a formation whose study 
has always been closely associated with the notion of development.
The concept of development is found in 
both the Latin and the Germanic languages, 
and interestingly, the basic meaning is al-
ways the same – in développement (French), 
sviluppo (Italian) and desarrollo (Span-
ish) as well as in Entwicklung (German) or 
ontwikkling (Dutch): the gradual release of 
something out of an “envelope” – a hiding 
and confining condition, or a condition of 
being rolled or folded together. Develop-
ment takes place where something that is 
already present in nuce comes out of a cover 
by which it was concealed and compressed, 
and starts gradually to unfold (Table 2). In 
fact, it seems as though the notion of development is inseparable from that of growth: 
As something is unwrapped in the course of its development, it becomes bigger; and as 
it grows, it changes not only in size but also in structure, governed by rules of growth 
that were already present but not yet fully expressed in earlier, less developed stages. 
In fact, “development” in modern, non-literal usage means orderly, regular, endoge-
nous transformation in a process of growth controlled from within and proceeding 
according to a predetermined pattern, or Bauplan.15 In this sense, development has 
mostly positive connotations – as in child development, human development, eco-
nomic development or social development – and tends to be identified with improve-
ment and advancement. Its direction is imagined to be essentially forward and upward, 
with simultaneous growth and change driven from within (Table 2). Thus nineteenth-
century social science has posited an ultimately universal transition from “lower” to 
“higher” or from “primitive” to “advanced” societies – see, for example, Durkheim’s 
theorem of increasing “dynamic density” causing functional differentiation (Durkheim 
1964 [1893]); Spencer’s account of history as steady progress from status to contract 
(Spencer 2003 [1882]); or Weber’s grand narrative of a worldwide spread of occidental 
rationalism (Weber 2002 [1904/5]).16 Similarly, after the Second World War, theories 
of “modernization,” or “industrialization,” assumed the presence of an irresistible en-
dogenous force in contemporary societies that moved them in a specifically “Western” 
direction, at least once the seeds of “development” – whatever they were believed to be 
15 The German word, Bauplan, has come to be used in evolutionary biology to refer to the overall 
design of an organism. For more on evolution, see below.
16 I treat Marx’s account of “capitalist development” as a special case, for reasons that will be ex-
plained further down.
Table 2 The concept of development
 Development
Property space Cumulative unfolding
 (“unwrapping”) of 
 embryonic pattern 
Direction Upward-growing
Source Endogenous dynamic
 trumps exogenous 
 contingencies
Mode Continuous passing of
 successive thresholds and
 stages
 Maturation
Mechanism Improved reproduction
 (learning)
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– were sown and the necessary “take-off” (Rostow 1990 [1960]) had set the process in 
motion. Soon it became common in United Nations parlance to distinguish between 
“developed” und “underdeveloped” countries, the latter soon to be renamed “develop-
ing.” Conceptually, development involved the continuous crossing of thresholds and 
the passing into successive stages of a process of maturation, in which societies learned 
to reproduce their social order in ways that made it continuously less traditional and 
more modern: i.e., more prosperous, equitable, efficient, democratic and autonomous 
(Table 2).
What remains of the concept of development as a tool for understanding historical 
change if we leave behind postwar modernization theory and its obviously highly ideo-
logical connotations? I believe that today, the fundamental problem associated with any 
conceptualization of history as development is the inherent linearity and determinism 
of the implied process of transformative growth once it has started. Underlying this is 
a sense that development is controlled by a preset, fixed endpoint toward which it is 
targeted – a future condition that is already present in embryonic, unfinished form in 
the current condition, which it strives to leave behind in order to realize itself. Develop-
ment, in other words, is at its core a teleological concept: That which develops is pulled 
forward by a future state unfolding itself inside and through its present state. Earlier 
stages contain later stages in unfinished, preliminary form, as in the growth of an or-
ganism from embryo to fully “developed” adult. As the developing organism matures, it 
continuously passes thresholds, and while crises are possible, the way they are resolved 
is also basically predetermined. The target, the telos, the Ziel is engraved into the process 
and is never in question: In fact, it is both the endpoint and the driver of the historical 
process through which it materializes. 
History conceived as development, then, is a front-loaded process governed by a pre-
established final condition. This is why the notion of development has rightly – and, I 
believe, irredeemably – fallen into disrepute in the social sciences: It construes the social 
world in a deterministic fashion and leaves no space for agency and choice, conflict and 
contradiction, risk and uncertainty, and for creative invention and reinvention of the 
future as it unfolds. In many ways, developmentalism suffers from the same problem 
as did orthodox Marxism at the beginning of the twentieth century: If history is self-
driven and progress is inevitable and self-sustained, why not just wait until it has com-
pleted itself? If this seems unacceptable for reasons of practical experience and theoreti-
cal plausibility, the next question is whether rejecting teleological theories of historical 
change forces us to accept the nihilistic position that history is nothing but a chaotic 
sequence of reversible fluctuations. Is there something else beyond teleology other than 
accident and disorder?
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3 A note on evolution
One way of addressing this question is by looking for a theoretical model of dynamic 
historical change in which the passage of time is a causal force; events and conditions 
are conceived as historically unique; and change, while driven by causes rather than 
pulled by effects, is intelligibly patterned. The concept that suggests itself here is that 
of evolution. Interestingly, the etymological origin of the word is very close to that of 
development. In Latin, evolutio means the unrolling of a scroll. Over time, the concept 
became linked to the notion of growth accompanied by a successive emergence of more 
complex structures, and in this sense, it did in fact become partly synonymous with the 
concept of development. Remarkably, its first application to natural history is found in 
the writings of Charles Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802), although 
its modern usage was defined only by his grandson’s epoch-making treatise on the ori-
gin of species (Darwin 2004 [1859]).
There have been innumerable attempts, both famous and infamous, to import Darwin-
ian evolutionism into social science. To avoid a long albeit exciting discussion, I will sim-
ply suggest that there are several connotations of the concept of evolution as it is used 
today in evolutionary biology that are less than helpful, and in fact sometimes deeply 
misleading, when employed in the study of social order. Among the misapplications of 
biological-evolutionary theory to the social world are the following three in particular:
(1) Sociobiological naturalism, or reductionism, which suggests that social structures and 
social action are an expression of biologically anchored, genetically hard-wired behav-
ioral programs inherited by humans through the long line of descent from their an-
cestors in the animal kingdom. Such programs, all of them supposedly geared toward 
securing the survival of the species – or of a particular genetic strain within it – are 
imagined to function like a collective subconscious that is the deep cause of human 
behavior and social arrangements, even where the latter are perceived by the actors 
involved in very different, non-biological, non-instinctive, normative terms. Trying to 
explain human action and the social structures it gives rise to by inherited instincts, as 
for example in the now-fashionable discipline of “behavioral economics,” misses their 
wide, “un-natural” diversity over time and in space, a diversity that Adam Smith already 
knew arises not from nature, but from individuals growing into and being shaped by 
the social structure of the division of labor (Smith 1993 [1776]).17 In the real, historical 
world, it is this socially and culturally generated diversity that makes the difference that 
matters, not its biological substructure that has long lost its capacity to determine what 
humans do.18
17 To learn by experiment that in a “dictator game,” people tend to follow norms of fairness rather 
than maximize what economists believe is their utility, is much less interesting than the question 
how the boss of a private equity fund can come to believe that it is right for him to maximize his 
profits by depriving other people of their employment and their families of their livelihood.
18 In the course, apparently, of an evolutionary process that gradually replaced instinctive behav-
ior with normatively based, intentional action (Gehlen 1986).
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(2) Adaptive functionalism, which posits that any trait exhibited by a species can and 
must be explained as a product of adaptation. Adaptation occurs through intergenera-
tional selection, in the course of which a structure gradually changes to become opti-
mally capable of contributing to successful reproduction under conditions of a general 
“struggle for existence.” Mainstream evolutionary biologists take this to mean that ex-
planation of any structure observed in the real world requires the production of an 
“adaptive story” showing the structure to be a superior solution to a problem faced in 
competition for reproductive opportunities (Gould/Lewontin 1979). Especially when 
applied to society, the logic of this approach leads to a Panglossian functionalism,19 
which posits that the mere fact that something exists means that it must be optimal for 
the fulfillment of some functional requirement, even if that requirement has yet to be 
detected (Gould/Lewontin 1979). Theory, then, is the identification of the task for the 
performance of which an observed condition represents an optimal solution. As far as 
the social sciences are concerned, it is in particular, but by no means only, efficiency and 
equilibrium theories that tend to exhibit a Panglossian logic.20 
Nevertheless, even evolutionary biologists have noted that functionally backward ex-
planations, or inductions, are highly dubious. The problem is not just that it is logi-
cally possible to invent an adaptive story about everything (Gould/Lewontin 1979). In 
addition, as Darwin already knew, the fitness of an organism can be assessed only in 
relation to its historical environment and the contingent challenges that environment 
happens to pose.21 Assuming a priori that an observed structure must be perfect or 
ideal, and from there interpolating the purpose that it perfectly and ideally serves, may 
therefore be deeply misleading.22 In part, this is because when finding new solutions to 
newly arising problems, nature must work with the available organic material, which 
subjects evolution to what Gould and Lewontin (1979) call “phyletic constraint,” mak-
19 Dr. Pangloss is a character in a satirical novel by Voltaire, Candide, ou l’Optimisme (1759). His 
is a Leibnizian rational-deductive optimism, as expressed in his favorite dictum, “All is for the 
best in the best of all possible worlds,” a philosophy which he continues to assert in the face of 
the most deplorable conditions and events. The logic he invokes – which Voltaire ridicules while 
Leibniz considered it a satisfactory solution to the problem of theodicy – is that the existing 
world is the only world that exists, and since only one world can exist it is the only possible world. 
If only one world is possible, then, the world that exists must be the best world in the universe 
of N=1 possible worlds.
20 For more on this see Streeck (2009), especially Ch. 13.
21 “As natural selection acts by competition, it adapts the inhabitants of each country only in 
relation to the degree of perfection of their associates … Nor ought we to marvel if all the con-
trivances in nature, be not, as far as we can judge, absolutely perfect; and if some of them be 
abhorrent to our idea of fitness … The wonder indeed is, on the theory of natural selection, that 
more cases of the want of absolute perfection have not been observed …” (Darwin 2004 [1859]: 
507f.) See also the example of the bug Darwin discovered on an island that contained almost no 
flying insects. Apparently its ancestors had been those mutants of a former species that were not 
very good at flying. The better fliers were regularly driven into the sea by the strong winds, and 
they became extinct. Fittest for the “struggle for existence” were those individuals that were least 
fit for flying.
22 For instructive examples see Gould and Lewontin (1979). 
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ing the structures it creates less adapted to their purpose than they might ideally be if 
they could be designed “from scratch.” If a land-going animal returns to the sea, as did 
the ancestors of the whales, it cannot redevelop gills instead of lungs, even though gills 
would be much better adapted to its new-old environment. There is also the possibility 
that an observed structure is not yet or no longer optimally adapted and is still in the 
process of evolving toward optimality or, to the contrary, dying out – possibilities that 
biologists may feel they can discount because of the geological time periods with which 
they are dealing. Social scientists, however, are concerned with comparatively very short 
time spans, during which it is not only possible but in fact likely that whatever structure 
they observe is still struggling to find its optimal form, if at all, and may in fact, due to 
fast-changing external conditions, be chasing a moving target, or several moving targets 
at once, without ever reaching something like equilibrium.
(3) Social Darwinism, which is a prescriptive political ideology that stipulates that free 
markets and laissez-faire economic policies are optimal institutions for economic and 
social progress. They are believed to be that because they seem best to replicate the 
Darwinian “struggle for existence,” through which nature eliminates less “fit” individu-
als from procreation and thereby continually improves and progressively optimizes the 
properties of organisms and species. Note that the key phrase of Social Darwinism, 
“survival of the fittest,” was not coined by Darwin but by the sociologist and philoso-
pher Herbert Spencer (1866–67), who was certainly the most influential Social Darwin-
ist. Darwin approved of the phrase when he read it and later adopted it, as it accorded 
with his deep-seated Malthusian convictions that had influenced his view of natural 
history early on. 
Social Darwinism prescribes that we must design the institutions that organize our so-
cieties in such a way that they eliminate the weak, so as to make space for the strong, 
and with them for the steady improvement of individuals and continuous progress of 
society. Spencer believed that unfettered free markets were best suited to give the best 
the free reign they need and deserve. Being able to make choices, however, human so-
cieties may decide that the character traits that are “fittest” for a competitive market 
are not the only ones that they may want to cultivate in its members as they “struggle 
for existence.” While Spencer used Darwin to argue that this would be unnatural and 
therefore a mistake, there is nothing in Darwinism as such that would prevent a society 
from rewarding not just greed but also, say, solidarity.23
23 A variant of Social Darwinism is the economistic, rational-choice version of neo-institution-
alism. In rational-choice theories of institutional change, alternative solutions to problems of 
economic efficiency are, as it were, experimentally generated by and within societies, where they 
then compete in a market for institutions in which the most efficient solution is selected and 
retained. The result is linear progress to ever higher efficiency, a process one could, with Weber, 
describe as “rationalization.” Underlying assumptions include that institutions are created and 
maintained to be efficient solutions to economic problems; that efficiency is ultimately the only 
value societies wish, or should wish, to institutionalize; and that there is something like a perfect 
market for institutions. The conceptual difficulties of rational choice institutionalism are laid 
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Outside of sociobiological reductionism, Panglossian adaptive functionalism, and 
Spencerian free-market Social Darwinism, however, there are a number of elements in 
Darwinian evolutionary theory that appear highly suitable for import into a dynamic 
theory of institutional change, provided that the limits of the parallels between the two 
are kept in mind and inappropriate analogies are avoided:24
(1) The variation-cum-selective-retention model of natural history offers a concept of 
historical change that is distinctly non-teleological – i.e., not conditioned on the pres-
ence of a provident and all-powerful designer guiding change to a preconceived end. In 
Darwinism properly understood, variation is stochastic from the perspective of existing 
structures, while retention is systematic without being governed by a predetermined 
result. As noted, unlike development, evolution is driven by causes, not by effects: It 
is back-loaded rather than front-loaded. A theory of institutional change constructed 
on the model of evolutionary theory, therefore, need not assume that the design of an 
institution is controlled by actors who know what they want and what they are doing, 
and have the capacity to do it. At the same time, there is no reason to preclude that the 
mechanism of selection may be one of collective-political decision-making, operating 
on the random variations produced by imperfect reproduction, just as imperfect re-
production by random variation may be caused by innovative ideas that, by their very 
nature, deviate in unforeseeable ways from established ideas and received wisdom.
(2) In Darwinian evolution, change is both permanent and gradual, endogenously 
driven by stochastic imperfections in reproduction as well as exogenously conditioned 
either by random shocks, such as natural disasters, or by other, parallel processes of 
gradual change. The theory allows for unpredictable events as well as coherent sequences 
of events. Evolutionary natural history accommodates contingency into order that is 
conceived as historical, suggesting the possibility in turn to think not only of nature but 
also of history as an evolutionary process. 
(3) The non-teleological continuity of evolutionary change – due to randomness of 
internal variation and exogeneity of selection – makes Darwin’s world a genuinely 
Heraclitian world. Darwinian evolutionary theory can therefore serve as a model for a 
bare by a close reading of the work of one its most prominent representatives, Douglass North. 
Having started out with a triumphalist efficiency-theoretical account of the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism, with the introduction of capitalist property springing from a collective 
desire for higher productivity (North/Thomas 1973), North’s more recent work is mainly con-
cerned with explaining the persistence of “inefficient” institutions (North 1990) which, how-
ever, are still treated as suboptimal deviations from what institutions really should be, namely 
rational devices to minimize transaction costs. We suggest that variation in social orders, un-
like rational choice institutionalism, is not typically driven by competition between alternative 
institutions but by the imperfect, or innovative, enactment of extant ones. Moreover, we posit 
that institutional selection takes place not through competitive markets, but through political 
conflict and social control, including the reactions of rule-makers to the unruly behavior of 
rule-takers (Streeck/Thelen 2005).
24  On the following see also Krasner (1988).
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processual theory of social systems in which an explainable past and present are faced 
with an open future. A Darwinian historical-evolutionary perspective better reflects the 
experience of human actors as historical actors in a historical world than do functional-
ist or rationalist sociological or economic theories.
(4) Darwinian evolutionism allows for a causal contribution of the passage of time 
to structural change, just as it reserves a conceptual space for innovation through im-
perfect, deviant reproduction. In fact, evolutionary theory suggests that innovation is 
permanent and ongoing, as there can be no perfect replication of any extant structure 
over time. This is in line with an Heraclitian concept of institutional change, for which 
the perfect replication of a social institution in its enactment represents no more than a 
limiting case. Moreover, evolutionary theory appreciates the essentially anarchic nature 
of innovation, conceiving of it as arising spontaneously and unpredictably from the 
perspective of the existing order and established practice. Darwinism also understands 
how processes of co-evolution may lead to complex non-linear interactions between the 
causal forces that shape historical structures and events, which again cannot be pre-
dicted. Co-evolution can serve as a model of separate but parallel and interdependent 
lines of causation and strands of development merging into a broad stream of systemic 
change through mutual support or mutual subversion.25 In these and other respects, 
familiarity with Darwinian theory properly understood may restore to the social sci-
ences their good conscience in construing their object world as historically unique – a 
good conscience they seem to have lost in their encounter with modern economics and 
its godfather, eighteenth-century physics.
(5) As already mentioned, Darwinian evolutionism entails a conception of nature as a 
continuous historical process, in which previous events circumscribe current and future 
ones. Evolution can only work with and transform material that it has itself produced in 
the past and inherited from that past. This material is not infinitely malleable – which is 
captured by the concept of phyletic constraint. New designs meeting new demands must 
be gradually developed out of old designs adapted to old demands. In an evolutionary 
approach, structural change results from an encounter between underdetermined and 
unpredictable innovations and historically grown determining conditions. Its ultimate 
direction depends on which of the many continuously arising combinations of old and 
new best meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities inherent in the internal and 
external environment. The affinity to notions of path dependency in the social sciences 
is obvious, especially to more sophisticated theories which provide for the possibility of 
significant change even on an established path, in addition or as an alternative to chang-
ing from one path to another. Evolutionary theory also militates against voluntaristic 
theories of action where the new arises out of nothing, as well as against static concep-
tions of the world as a constant universe, in which change can be undone at any time if 
the factors that have caused it disappear.
25 See Streeck (2009), Ch. 7.
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(6) Finally, also as indicated, Darwinian evolutionism in its pluralist version allows for 
less-than-optimal structures caused by, among other things, phyletic constraint, transi-
tional disequilibrium, survival of historical adaptations that have become useless, and 
the purposeless reproduction of slack structures with no function at all. Functionalist 
explanations apply only to a limited range of phenomena. The message for the social 
sciences is that outside of adaptationist Darwinian dogmatism, for which organisms are 
by definition optimally rationalized reproduction machines, evolutionary theory is not 
an efficiency theory, which among other things makes it illegitimate for neoclassical eco-
nomics to justify its foundational assumptions by anchoring them in evolutionary biol-
ogy. Rather than providing a template for a functionalist efficiency-theoretical account 
of the world, evolutionary biology in its non-fundamentalist, pluralist version (Gould 
2002) conceives of adaptation as embedded in and interacting with a historical context 
that cannot itself be explained as an outcome of rational construction aimed at maxi-
mizing efficiency. In this way, evolutionary biology can be read as encouraging a histori-
cal approach to institutions and institutional change that allows for historical as well as 
rational-functionalist explanations of observed conditions and understands the limits of 
rationalization and functional explanations within evolving structures and processes.
Darwinian evolutionism, that is to say, may serve as a model for a theory of institutional 
change in several ways. It provides an example of a non-teleological but nevertheless in-
telligible account of history in which the future is not predetermined, leaving space for 
human agency. It identifies imperfect reproduction as a source of continuous gradual 
change, and thereby defines a place where a (micro-)theory of action might be inserted 
into a dynamic (macro-)theory of social order. It elaborates a processual view of the 
natural world which seems eminently transferable to the social world; it introduces 
time as a central variable in a theory of nature, by implication suggesting its inclusion 
in theories of society as well; it demonstrates how path dependency may be accommo-
dated in a non-teleological theory of change, recognizing the causal significance of past 
events for present and future ones; and when read correctly, it is fundamentally sub-
versive of an efficiency-theoretical construction of historical structures and processes, 
making space for explicit recognition of the role of non-efficient or non-rational forces 
in the evolution of social order. 
At least one major issue remains unresolved, however, which is the question of the di-
rection of historical change or, for that matter, of development. The nineteenth century 
and Darwin himself as a matter of course considered evolution to be a more or less 
linear progression of “development” from “lower” to “higher” forms of life, its crown-
ing peak being homo sapiens. “Higher” forms of life were more composite organisms 
that combined an ever-larger number of heterogeneous parts into a complex, organic, 
well-coordinated whole. Note that this was exactly the way Durkheim defined his “high-
er,” “advanced” societies, based on organic as distinguished from mechanical solidarity 
(Durkheim 1964 [1893]). But just as the social sciences dissociated themselves from the 
notion of progress in the second half of the twentieth century, so too did evolutionary bi-
ology with the emergence of the neo-Darwinian synthesis. In fact, the way this happened 
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was very similar, as the discovery of the genetic base of inheritance and mutation caused 
something like a micro-analytical turn in evolutionary theory comparable to the search 
in neoclassical economics for a universal, ahistoric, theoretical “micro-foundation.” In 
the new mainstream of evolutionary biology, it was the gene – now characteristically 
described as “egoistic” – that became the agent of combat in the “struggle for existence.” 
Organisms turned into vessels used by opportunistic genes to secure their survival at the 
expense of less well-entrenched competitors (Dawkins 1989). Like actors in neoclassical 
economics, genes in modern evolutionary biology do not change; they know no prog-
ress, and their highest and only goal is survival, for the sake of which they may combine 
with other genes in composite structures, but only for strategic purposes.26
The problem this raises is well known also to macro-sociologists deprived of the notion 
of development by the relativistic revolution: How can one explain the enormous build-
up of complexity over the longue durée of history, natural as well as social, culminating 
in biological evolution in the human brain, and in social evolution in the rise of modern 
European, American or global society? If survival in competition, of monadic genes or 
monadic actors, was all that the world was about, how is one to account for the growth 
of ever-larger and ever more internally differentiated structures, with proportionately 
growing needs for ever more sophisticated and ever more vulnerable mechanisms of 
coordination? The ultimate provocation for late-twentieth-century evolutionary biol-
ogy is the observation that, if the survival of egoistic genes was all that mattered in 
natural history, there would have been no need whatsoever for life to “advance” beyond 
the “primitive” condition of bacteria living on the ocean floor, where they have repro-
duced with unmatched success in basically unaltered form since the beginning of time. 
Why make the effort and build ever more complex organisms that are also unendingly 
more at risk? What is it that drives nature’s, and society’s, apparently endemic quest 
for continuously rising levels of organized complexity? We may not be able to answer 
this question unless we are willing to assume that deep within organic matter there is 
some sort of desire not just for survival, but also for the autonomy, or freedom, that 
comes with complexity (Neuweiler 2008).27 Be this as it may, the contemporary debates 
among evolutionary biologists about whether or not there is something like self-orga-
nized direction in evolution, even in the absence of telos and design, encourage us as 
social scientists to no longer suppress the analogous question in social theory: What lies 
behind the historical “progress” toward more complex and differentiated societies and 
26 There is probably no place for history in a micro-theory. History seems to require interaction 
between a micro- and a macro-level, through an aggregation process that is more than just ad-
ditive. Recently evolutionary biologists have suggested that “selfish genes” colonizing the same 
organism may come in conflict with each other and threaten the survival of individuals and 
entire species (Trivers 2006). A theory in which a possibility of this kind is provided for has, in 
principle, space for both history and politics.
27 Renate Mayntz suggests that what we are observing here is a quest for “mastery,” which she 
regards as specific of and limited to human history and society. But here, too, we may want to 
look for gradual rather than categoric differences and for continuous rather than discontinuous 
change.
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social-institutional orders, and why is there an apparent tendency for segmental societ-
ies to become linked into composite ones over time, and for simple social structures to 
become more complex? 
4 Capitalist development
I will now proceed to argue that some of the historical specifications required for a dy-
namic theory of contemporary institutions, or a theory of contemporary institutional 
change, development, or evolution, may be contributed by a concept of capitalism as a 
system, or process, of social action. By capitalism as a system of social action, or as an 
institutionalized social order, I mean a specific set of institutions accommodating a spe-
cific, regularized actor disposition (habitus, character) and a specific distribution of re-
sources, or powers of agency. I do not claim that an account of contemporary society as 
a process of capitalist institutional development will explain everything, nor of course 
will it be capable of predicting the future. All it can aspire to, I believe, is to serve as a 
heuristic indicating where to look first and what to look for when trying to understand 
institutions and institutional change in the modern political economy. In fact, given 
the central role of human agency in history and society, anything other than a heuristic 
providing observers and actors with a checklist to work through when trying to come 
to terms with the social world may be impossible anyway.
In the following I will suggest a list of what I think could be elements of an institutional-
ist account of capitalism and capitalist development capable of founding a historically 
grounded comparative analysis of contemporary political-economic institutions and 
their change. The critical reader will note that the list is still rather syncretistic and in 
dire need of systematic revision and completion.28 
(1) Capitalist development may be conceived as a process of expansion of market re-
lations as the privileged, normal mode of economic exchange and social intercourse 
(Table 3) – of competitive contracting at prices that fluctuate with changes in the rela-
tion between supply and demand. As capitalism develops, market exchange gradually 
takes the place of older forms of social relations, in particular ones based on obligations 
of reciprocity. The widening, or spatial spread, of markets coincides with their deep-
ening, or intensification, as more and more social spheres and an increasing range of 
“necessaries of life” (Smith 1993 [1776]) become commodified – i.e., subsumed under 
a “self-regulating” price mechanism driven by actors’ self-interest, and made available 
in exchange for “bare Zahlung” (Marx/Engels 1972 [1848]). The spread of market rela-
tions over ever-new territorial spaces and social spheres, metaphorically characterized 
28 I have introduced some of the following points at greater length in my book, Re-Forming Capi-
talism (Streeck 2009). 
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by Rosa Luxemburg (Luxemburg 1913) in her theory of imperialism as a process of 
Landnahme (land grabbing), continuously and irreversibly changes the property space 
of social orders and gives direction to their evolution. In the process ever more previ-
ously parochial, or particularistic, social relations are linked into ever more encom-
passing, increasingly universal contexts (Marx and Engels’ “completion of the world 
market” by the “bourgeoisie,” as anticipated in the Manifesto of 1848).
(2) Capitalist Landnahme, the widening and deepening of market relations, is associated 
with a continuous restructuring of a society’s apparatus of social regulation and coordi-
nation. (This is a notion well-known to sociologists, since Durkheim, in the Division of 
Labor (Durkheim 1964 [1893]), linked the transition from mechanic to organic solidar-
ity to increases in a society’s size and density.) In the language of institutional analysis, 
the institutional change that comes with market expansion may be conceived in terms 
of a dialectical conflict between two types of institutions, obligatory and voluntaristic, 
or historically inherited and freely contracted (Table 4). Elsewhere (Streeck 2009) I have 
called the two types Durkheimian and Williamsonian, respectively.29 They correspond 
to two kinds of social order, one public and the other private. Liberal progressivism, first 
and foremost Herbert Spencer (Spencer 2003 [1882]), has described and still describes 
the expansion of markets as a long-term historical process replacing obligatory with 
contractual institutions – as an escape from traditionalism and as progress toward eco-
nomic rationalization and political liberation. Durkheim, of course, argued that the re-
gime of free contracts governing the division of labor could unfold only inside a society 
inherited, inevitably, from tradition: The order of freedom must remain “embedded,” to 
use the key concept of contemporary economic sociology, in an order of obligation. Un-
like what is suggested by the various Robinsonian founding myths of modernity, even 
under capitalism society is not a product of competitive contracting but its precondition. 
29 In some of the institutionalist literature they appear as competing conceptualizations – rational 
choice vs. historical-sociological – of institutions in general (Hall/Taylor 1996).
Table 3 Development and capitalist development
 Development Capitalist development
Property space Cumulative unfolding  Unfolding & expanding of market
 (“unwrapping”) of  relations and extended reproduction
 embryonic pattern  
Direction Upward-growing Sideward-growing
Source Endogenous dynamic Endogenous pressures for capital 
 trumps exogenous  accumulation (“profit”)
 contingencies 
Mode Continuous passing of  Discontinuous sequence
 successive thresholds and  of subversion and
 stages restoration of order
 Maturation 
 
Mechanism Improved reproduction  Competitive innovation
 (learning) 
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A world constituted by contract – a Spencerian liberal utopia – is to Durkheim, in Po-
lanyian language, no more than a “frivolous experiment” that is doomed to fail.30 In any 
case, the distinction between Durkheimian and Williamsonian institutions seems to of-
fer an appropriate template for studying institutional change and the transformation of 
social order in societies driven by the dynamic of an expanding capitalist market. 
(3) In a more substantive sense, social institutions under capitalism must circumscribe 
productive uncertainty with protective solidarity, as uncertainty must be contained for 
the sake of both the functioning of the market and the stability of its surrounding soci-
ety. As theorists from Marx to Polanyi have pointed out, self-regulating markets perma-
nently destabilize social structures as they continuously and unpredictably reset relative 
prices. This is ultimately why they cannot replace social regulation but in fact must 
be subjected to it. Nevertheless, as markets expand they self-destructively eat into and 
threaten to replace non-market institutions, causing permanent tension at the border-
line between the encircled market system trying to break out of its social containment, 
and the non-contractual institutions containing it. Even though markets cannot func-
tion without solidarity, they undermine and consume it, and as they advance call forth 
pressures for a restoration of the non-utilitarian, obligational bases of social order.31 
(4) The distinction between Durkheimian and Williamsonian institutions yields a sub-
stantive concept of politics in capitalism as a struggle over the periodic reorganization 
of institutionalized social obligations in response to advancing contractual order, mar-
ket expansion, and commodification. Societies with a market system residing inside 
them like a restless incubus must defend themselves against the market trying to break 
through and get out, a drive endemic in the logic of Landnahme regardless of the fact 
that outside of a surrounding society market systems could not function. Politics under 
capitalism, then, can be expected to be about the successive subversion and reorgani-
zation of public order, driven by the anomic and entropic tendencies emanating from 
30 This is nicely summarized in Joseph Schumpeter’s famous dictum, “No social system can work 
which is based exclusively upon a network of free contracts between (legally) equal contracting 
parties and in which everyone is supposed to be guided by nothing except his own (short-run) 
utilitarian ends” (Schumpeter 1975 [1942]: 417).
31 In the form, for example, of employment protection legislation or, more generally, political and 
social rights (Marshall 1965 [1949]).
Table 4 Two types of political-economic institutions
Durkheimian Williamsonian
Public order Private ordering
Obligational Voluntaristic
Exogenously imposed Endogenously contracted
Authoritative organization Voluntary coordination
Creation of obligations Reduction of transaction costs
Third party enforcement Self-enforcement
Government Governance
Status Contract
Source: Adapted from Streeck (2009: 15).
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self-regulating markets, and also about the de- and reconstruction of normatively in-
stitutionalized limits on the egoistic-rational pursuit of interests.32 A possible sequence 
of gradual market expansion, the liberalization and contractualization of institutions, 
and the periodic reorganization of public order in “political moments” (Streeck 2001) 
is shown in Figure 1.
(5) Studying institutional change as capitalist development provides institutional analy-
sis with a substantive micro-foundation in a theory of social action that is far more com-
plex and meaningful than, in particular, a theory of “rational choice.” A firmer historical 
grounding of historical institutionalism, with capitalism “brought back in,” makes for 
a richer model of the actor in what has been called “actor-centered institutionalism” 
(Mayntz/Scharpf 1995). In particular, the notion of capitalist development may be asso-
ciated with the advance of a typically opportunistic, non-traditionalist, individualistic, 
rational-egoistic, and utility-maximizing actor disposition. “Opportunism with guile” 
(Williamson 1987), as definitive of the homo oeconomicus of economic theory, repre-
sents the normalized ethos in the enactment of institutions in a historical context, in 
32 This is at the core of what Marx called “class struggle.”
Figure 1 Political cycles in capitalism  
Market expansion
Obligatory order Contractual order
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which a competitive breach of solidarity is in principle socially licensed and can never in 
any case be prevented or ruled out, and where restricting competition is fundamentally 
less legitimate than engaging in it (Streeck 2009: 242ff.). Capitalist institutions must 
assume, and thereby encourage, a utility-maximizing disposition on the part of actors, 
given that any compact between potential competitors may at any time fall apart if only 
one market participant is no longer satisfied with an average customary profit, and in 
breaking away threatens the survival of the others unless they retort in kind.
(6) Actors in capitalism, therefore, given their characteristic non-traditionalist restless-
ness, appear constitutively devious from the perspective of the institutions that are sup-
posed to govern them. The typical rule-taker in capitalism is a rule-bender: He reads 
rules entrepreneurially, i.e., “in bad faith,” incessantly looking for ways of interpreting 
them in his favor. Typical capitalist actors are rational-utilitarian exploiters of gaps in 
rules, in a culture that fundamentally approves of innovation in rule following, if not in 
rule violation, and has few legitimate means to enforce informal traditional standards 
of good faith. Creative enactment or non-enactment of rules may, after all, be an impor-
tant source of profit, and can routinely be justified as a necessary preemptive defense 
against elimination by competition. Interactions between rule-makers and rule-takers 
(Streeck/Thelen 2005) assume a specific flavor in capitalism that makes them specifi-
cally capitalist, with actors assumed and expected to be
fundamentally unruly: a permanent source of disorder from the perspective of social institu-
tions, relentlessly whacking away at social rules, continuously forcing rulers to rewrite them, 
and undoing them again by creatively exploiting the inevitable gap between general rules and 
their local enactment (Streeck 2009: 241).
(7) This being so, while social order is always and inevitably imperfectly enacted, imper-
fect enactment under capitalism may be expected to be biased and to exhibit a specific 
substantive “spin,” in the direction of liberalization and privatization, and indeed of 
“disorganization” from the perspective of obligatory institutions. Creative reinterpreta-
tion of public order to replace it with private ordering may be construed as the micro-
level dynamic at the base of the macro-level process of market expansion, giving histori-
cal definition to the general notion of unpredictable mutation in the production and 
reproduction of social structures. What is mutation for the evolution of life is the in-
novative individually-rational pursuit of advantage through competitive contracting for 
capitalist development. The resulting institutional dynamic is likely to be particularly 
visible at the border between market and society, where social institutions condition and 
limit market exchange. Again competition seems to be the driving force, as competitive 
contracting is assumed a priori to be legal, whereas “conspiracy against free trade” is a 
priori under suspicion of being illegal unless it is explicitly legalized; if it is, however, it 
is exposed to competitive subversion just as any other rule. As pointed out, the power of 
competition to shape social relations derives from the fact that one individual is in prin-
ciple enough to break up solidarity, whereas preventing competition requires collective 
action and, in principle, full cooperation among all potential competitors.
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(8) Another mechanism that biases capitalist institutional change in the direction of 
market expansion and liberalization, as well as imparting a specific bias on political 
struggles over reorganization of collective order, is the differential endowment of classes 
of social actors with resources, which is correlated with a differential distribution of 
behavioral dispositions. Unruly opportunism tends to come together with resourceful-
ness, or vice versa, jointly giving rise to “continuous pressures on and within institutions 
that slowly and gradually subvert Durkheimian social obligations while expanding the 
realm of voluntary, utility-maximizing action and Williamsonian social arrangements” 
(Streeck 2009: 240). While imperfect reproduction of institutions is a general feature 
of all social orders, different groups have characteristically different incentives and ca-
pacities to circumvent institutionalized rules or challenge their received meanings. An 
example are large firms who hire lobbyists to influence or change legislation, or tax 
lawyers that are
just one category of specialists in creative reinterpretation of formal social obligations for the 
purpose of avoiding them in a legally unassailable way. Creativity in such a context typically in-
volves studied absence of “good faith,” in the sense of a determined rejection of shared informal 
understandings on the meaning of the norm in question, combined with … an “undersocial-
ized” attitude of skillful instrumentalism in relation to social rules in general.
(Streeck 2009: 240f.)
Thus specification of contemporary institutional change as a process of capitalist de-
velopment33 opens a prospect for a dynamic theory of social order free of teleological 
determinism and linear progressivism (Table 4). Moreover, conducting institutional 
analysis, comparative or not, in the heuristic context of capitalist development helps 
avoid excessive abstractification and formalization that would deprive theory of sub-
stantive-historical content. In particular, analyzing institutional change as capitalist de-
velopment specifies the nature of the unfolding in time of the property space of insti-
tutional theory as a process of market expansion and advancing commodification, with 
competition, and the pressures it creates for maximizing the return on invested capital, 
as a driving force. Furthermore, by assigning a central place to conflict and discontinu-
ity, the notion of capitalist development accommodates political action by situating it 
in an endemic tension between solidaristic traditionalism and self-interested innova-
tion. It also draws attention to the endemic fragility of an institutional context that is 
continuously undermined by actors whose very capacity to act depends, paradoxically, 
on its continued existence. By grounding itself in a concept of capitalist development, 
contemporary political economy – the analysis of globalization and liberalization and 
of the crisis that followed both – would be usefully enriched by a historically concrete 
model of political-economic actors and of the relationship between actors and the in-
stitutions that embed them.
33 Characterized in Streeck and Thelen (2005) with reference to the 1990s as “liberalization,” and 
in Streeck (2009), following Polanyi (1957 [1944]), as a conflict between the expansion of mar-
kets and political efforts at their social containment.
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5 A brief summary
A dynamic perspective on institutions and on the social world in general seems vastly 
preferable to a static one. A dynamic theory of society locates its objects in an irrevers-
ible flow of time, thereby recognizing their historical nature and uniqueness. Change 
appears both permanent and incremental, with the most important changes in human 
conditions related to or caused by the passage of time.
Recognition of time as a constitutive element in and of social structures draws new at-
tention to the notion of development that was omnipresent in nineteenth-century social 
science but later came to be abandoned in favor of abstract analytical universalism and 
timeless generalization. Historical periods like the present one, in which history seems 
to move faster than before, cast doubt on the applicability and usefulness of representa-
tions of the social world as a set of immutable causal mechanisms. Doing justice to the 
historicity of social facts without falling back on nineteenth-century ideas of historical 
determinism or linear progress may be made possible by a fresh reading of theories 
of evolution, which explain change as an interaction between spontaneous variation 
within a historically inherited repertoire of possibilities and a set of external conditions 
that are themselves in constant flux.
Modeling the dynamic of the contemporary social world and its political economy as 
a process of capitalist development seems to be a promising way of specifying the forces 
and mechanisms driving institutional change today (Table 5). In particular, the notion 
of capitalist development identifies the expansion of market relations as the main source 
of change in extant forms of institutional coordination. It also suggests a specification 
of the relationship between actors and institutions that fills the empty spaces caused 
by over-generalized concepts of action, like rational choice, or by neglect of the need 
for a micro-foundation of macro-sociological theorizing. Most importantly, theories of 
capitalist development give historically concrete definition to the process of innovation 
effective, in principle, in all social structures, by spelling out the particular logic and 
accounting for the particular bias inherent in the dynamically imperfect reproduction 
of a capitalist social order. And finally, the notion of capitalist development explicitly 
provides for tensions, conflicts and contradictions in historical institutional change, 
specifying the nature of such conflicts as being over the extent to which society can in-
sist on social obligations outside the voluntarism of a free pursuit of interests through 
competitive innovation and private contractual ordering.
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Table 5 Institutional change and capitalist development
Static change Dynamic change Development Capitalist development
Property 
space
Constant
Universal
Historical
Periodic
Cumulative unfolding 
(“unwrapping”) of 
embryonic pattern
Unfolding & expanding 
of market relations and 
extended reproduction
Direction Reversible
Fluctuating
Irreversible
Sequential
Upward-growing Sideward-growing
Source Exogenous-
contingent
Endogenous-dialectical 
Exogenous-contingent
Endogenous dynamic 
trumps exogenous 
contingencies
Endogenous 
pressures for capital 
accumulation (“profit”)
Mode Punctuated 
equilibrium
Incremental
Crossing of thresholds
Continuous passing of 
successive thresholds 
and stages
Maturation
Discontinuous sequence 
of subversion and 
restoration of order
Mechanism Short sharp 
shocks
Imperfect reproduction
Time & age: Layering, 
conversion, drift, 
exhaustion etc.
Improved reproduction 
(learning)
Competitive innovation
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